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Abstract 
 
 
 
In the current efforts towards harmonizing IPRs regimes in the African continent, this 
paper provides answers to four key questions relevant in the policy decision making 
processes. After empirically examining the questions, the following findings are established. 
(1) In comparison to common law countries, civil law countries inherently have a significant 
autonomous rate of piracy; consistent with the ‘law and property rights’ theory. (2) But for 
IPRs laws, the other IP protection channels (WIPO treaties, Main IP law and Multilateral 
treaties) reduce the incidence of piracy. (3) In both short-run and long-term, IPRs protection 
channels in civil law countries appear to mitigate piracy more than in common law countries. 
(4) Formal institutions are instrumental in the  fight against piracy through IPRs protection 
channels.  
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1. Introduction  
 
It has become crystal clear that, for any country, region or continent to be actively 
involved in the global economy, it must be competitive. Competition derives from intellectual 
property (IP), which is protected by intellectual property laws. In recent history, there has 
been a wide consensus on the key role that intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection and 
strength of IPRs regimes play in promoting innovation processes and economic growth.  
Hence, the debate has centered around IPRs protection, with some scholars postulating that 
increased protection of IPRs stimulates economic growth and development through the 
appealing impact on factor productivity (Gould & Gruben, 1996; Falvey et al., 2006). On the 
other hand, skeptics are of the stance that, IPRs protection and adherence to international 
treaties (laws) may seriously infringe the growth prospects of developing countries (Yang & 
Maskus, 2001). This strand  supports its thesis by  purporting that, less tight IPRs regimes are 
necessary (at least in the short-term) for developing countries, to enable knowledge spillovers, 
imperative for growth and development. In their perspective, the existing technology in 
developing countries is more imitative and/or adaptive in nature and not suitable for the 
creation of new innovations1.   
 In the light of above debate, while theoretical literature has addressed the concern to 
some degree, little scholarly attention has been paid to empirical literature. The focus of the 
existing empirical studies has been on socio-economic determinants of piracy in several 
copyright industries (Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Banerjee et al., 2005; Peitz & Waelbroeck, 
2006; Andrés, 2006; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Andrés & Goel, 2012). 
However, the debate has recently shifted towards measures needed to curb the proliferation of 
technology used to copy or pirate commodities. The recent trend of globalization, 
strengthened by increasingly sophisticated information and communication technologies 
                                                 
1This school of thought has gained prominence in the debate over  if ‘permission’ should be granted to permit 
‘copying’ of life-saving pharmaceuticals, especially those used in the management of HIV/AIDS in developing 
countries most affected and least likely to afford such treatments.  
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(ICTs) has motivated efforts towards increasing and harmonizing the standards (and 
enforcement) of IPRs protection worldwide. Europe and North America have mastered the 
dynamics of IP and inexorably driving developments in the global and international arena. 
Other regions like Asia and South America are reacting in calculated steps that underscores 
the role of IP in the current pursuit of national, regional and international initiatives. In Africa, 
IPRs issues are also assuming central stage in discussions on development in the continent.  
 To the best of our knowledge, current efforts towards harmonizing IPRs regimes in the 
continent will be eased if policy makers have answers to the following four questions. (1) 
Which IPRs regimes matter in the fight against piracy? (2) How do legal origins matter in the 
effectiveness of IPRs regimes? (3) Are formal institutions instrumental in the enforcements of 
IPRs regimes? (4) If so, for which IPRs protection channels are they instrumental? Answers to 
the questions will provide the much needed policy guidance, as blanket IPRs regimes may not 
be effective without due considerations of legal origins in the policy making process. The 
intuition behind this hypothesis is that, legal origins differ in the emphasis they place on 
private property rights vis-à-vis those of the state. Hence, then need for standardization of 
IPRs regimes to be contingent on existing trends in their effectiveness and tailored differently 
across countries with diverse legal origins.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines existing literature. 
Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 3. Section 4 covers 
empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Theoretical framework: legal origins and  IPRs 
 
 This section describes the ‘law and property rights theory’. We devote space to spell-
out the difference in how legal heritage continue to shape private property rights protection, 
investor protection laws and development today. In this section, we also describe two 
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mechanisms via which legal-origin may affect the contracting environment: the political and 
adaptability mechanisms.   
 
2.1.1   Law, enforcement and private property rights  
   
The first strand of the ‘law and property rights’ theory emphasizes  that, legal 
institutions influence property rights and development (La Porta et al., 1998). The ‘law and 
property rights theory’ stresses that, cross-country differences in: (i) contract, company, 
bankruptcy and security laws; (ii) the legal system’ emphasis on private property rights, and; 
(iii) the efficiency of enforcement,  influence the degree of expropriation and hence the 
confidence by which people are motivated to take part in innovation and invention processes. 
As sustained by La Porta et al. (2000) and backed by Beck & Levine (2005), the ‘law and 
property rights’ view follows naturally from the evolution of corporate laws handed down to 
colonies during the past half century. A country’s contract, company, security, bankruptcy 
and IPRs laws, as well as the enforcement of these laws fundamentally determine the rights of 
IP holders and the level of innovation.   
 Concerning how legal establishments should influence IP and the strength of IPRs, 
within a broad vision there are differing opinions regarding the degree to which legal systems 
should support the private contractual arrangements and the degree to which the legal system 
should have specific laws concerning property rights. According to Coasians (Coase, 1960), 
the legal system should simply enforce private contracts. Hence, effective legal 
establishments allow knowledgeable and experienced market participants to design a vast 
array of sophisticated private contracts in a bid to ameliorate complex agency problems 
(Coase, 1960; Stigler, 1964; Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991).  The ‘law and private property’ 
theory three-point view has been highlighted in the introduction of this strand. Whether 
assuming a Coasian dependence on enforcing complex private contracts or an approach that 
augments the support of private contracts with company, bankruptcy, securities, IPR 
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laws…etc, the ‘law and property rights’ theory argues that the degree of protection of private 
property is a paramount determinant of incentives to innovation and invention that ultimately 
lead to development.  
 
2.1.2  From legal-origin to piracy: political and adaptability mechanisms 
  
In the second strand, we extend theories by Beck et al. (2003) in presenting a case as 
to ‘why’ legal origin matters in IPRs, innovation and development.  They have examined two 
channels  by which legal origins may influence development: the political and adaptability 
channels.  
 The political mechanism is based on two standpoints. Firstly, legal traditions differ in 
the emphasis they attribute to protecting the rights of private investors (in innovation for 
example) relative to those of the state. Secondly, private property rights protection forms the 
foundation for innovation and development. Hence, historical based differences in legal origin 
can help explain existing disparities  in development with respect to this component of law 
and ‘investor right’ (La Porta et al., 1998).  A great many scholars argue that the Civil law has 
tended to support the rights of the State, vis-à-vis private property rights, which is quite the 
opposite in Common law. Hence, Civil law countries have provided for legal systems that 
have unhealthy implications for innovation and development. A powerful State with a 
responsive civil law at its disposal, will tend to divert the flows of society’s resources towards 
favored ends, which is not conducive  to competition. More so, a powerful  State will have 
difficulty credibly committing to not interfere in the innovation process, that will also obstruct 
financial development. Thus, the ‘law and property rights’ theory emphasizes that Civil law 
countries will have feebler property rights protection and lower levels of innovation (and 
development) than countries with other legal traditions. In contrast, Common law has 
historically tended to side with private property owners against the State. Instead of becoming 
a tool of the state, Common law has acted as a powerful tool in the upholding of private 
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property rights. Rajan & Zingales (2003) note that governments in Civil law countries were 
more effective than governments in Common law countries in stretching the role of 
government at the cost of market growth during the Interwar period 1919-1939. They attribute 
this difference to the heavy task of the judiciary vis-à-vis the legislature. Thus, ‘the law and 
property rights’ theory postulates that the British Common law supports innovation 
development to a greater extent than Civil law systems.  
 The second mechanism linking legal origin to development is the adaptability channel, 
that is also built on two premises. On a first note, legal systems differ in their ability to adjust  
to changing and evolving circumstances. Secondly, if  a country’s legal system adapts only 
slowly to changing circumstance (especially economic), large gaps will open between the 
innovation needs of an economy and the ability of the legal system to support and fulfill those 
needs. An influential, albeit by no means unanimous position of inquiry holds that legal 
systems that espouse case and judicial discretion tend to adhere more efficiently to changing 
conditions than legal systems that adapt rigidly to formalistic procedures and that rely more 
strictly on judgments narrowly based on statutory law (Coase, 1960). Posner (1973) disputes 
that although legislators consider the incidence on particular individuals and interest groups 
when writing statutes, judges are forbidden from considering the deservedness of specific  
litigants and thus more likely to render decisions founded on objective efficiency criteria 
(Rubin, 1982, 205). It follows that, Common law systems are much more efficient than 
statutory-based systems because inefficient laws are routinely litigated and re-litigated 
pushing the law toward more efficient outcomes (Rubin, 1977; Priest, 1977), especially in the 
rapidly evolving context of ICTs and IPRs protection. From another perspective, some 
authors argue that statutory law evolves slowly and is subject to a greater degree of inefficient 
political pressures than Common law (Posner, 1973; Bailey & Rubin, 1994).  
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2. 2 Intellectual property rights (IPRs) and development 
 
There are two principal avenues along which intellectual property (IP) and the strength 
of IPRs regimes are thought to affect the level of economic growth and development ( 
Bezmen & Depken, 2004). The first strand provides analysis of  the extent to which IPRs 
influence the creation of novel knowledge and information within nations, as well as the 
diffusion of existing knowledge across countries. The second strand is focused on the indirect 
effects of a nation’s IPRs regime on international transactions that provide factors crucial for 
the growth process.  
 In the first strand which is tilted towards ‘creation and dissemination of information’, 
IPRs protection could be traced to the foundation of endogenous theories of economic growth 
whereby, investment in research and development (R&D) rewards individual investors with 
profit (returns) and also augments society’s stock of knowledge. Lowering the cost of future 
innovation and invention, improves the accumulation of knowledge for economic growth 
(Romer, 1990; Grossman & Helpman, 1991). The underlying wisdom of tighter and 
restrictive IPRs regimes is based on the notion that, protection of IPRs serves as a catalyst to 
growth by encouraging inventions and innovations. In recent history, many newly 
industrialized countries have campaigned for stronger IPRs through bilateral, multilateral and 
regional arrangements. This difference in approach derives from the desire of developing 
countries to specialize in labor intensive production in agricultural industries. Until much 
recently, these industries have greatly benefited from shared knowledge spillovers and  public 
expenditures have largely supported them in research and technology.  
 In the second strand, IPRs may also influence a nation’s growth and development 
process through their influence on the nation’s ability to engage in international transactions  
such as technology transfers, trade and, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows (Bezmen & 
Depken, 2004).  The endogenous growth theories have presented international trade as an 
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important stimulus to economic prosperity, since access to world markets could spur greater 
utilization of human resources (Todaro & Smith, 2003), and ease the transmission of 
technology by providing contact with foreign counterparts and direction of domestic resources 
towards more research focused and intensive sectors. Nevertheless, these models do not 
necessarily predict that openness brings economic growth for all countries and under all 
circumstances; principally because theoretical prediction depends on country-specific 
conditions. There is substantial documentation to support the view that, a stronger IPRs 
regime is a crucial factor in attracting the inflows of FDI and technological transfers (Lee & 
Mansfield, 1996), stimulating exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995) and increasing the 
possibility of investment undertaken by multinational enterprises (Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 
1996). From the other side of the coin, stronger IPRs protection could mitigate the need for 
FDI (Yang & Maskus, 2001). 
 
 
3. Methodology  
 
3.1 Data 
 
3.1.1 Measuring piracy  
 
The measure of piracy is the software piracy rate, which is defined as “the 
unauthorized copying of computer software which constitutes copyright infringement for 
either commercial or personal use” (SIIA, 2000). Software piracy is multidimensional, 
complex and could potentially take many avenues – e.g., organized copiers, piracy by 
individuals and commercial or business piracy. Hence,  obtaining an accurate measure of the 
prevalence of software piracy remains quite a challenge in the literature. Borrowing from the 
Business Software Alliance (BSA), there are many types of piracy and we can distinguish  
among: 1) end user copying; 2) downloading; and 3) counterfeiting. Piracy level is computed 
as the difference in demand for new software applications (computed from PC shipments) and 
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the legal supply of software. In the present paper, the measure of piracy employed is the 
percentage of software (primarily business software) in a country that is illegally installed 
(without a license) on a yearly basis and is taken to capture the level of piracy in software. 
This proxy is reported in percentages, varying from 0 % (or no piracy) to 100 % (i.e., all 
software installed is of pirated origin). Piracy data is gathered from the Business Software 
Alliance (BSA, 2007). Additional discussion on measurement could be obtained from BSA 
(2009)2.  BSA is an industry group; nonetheless its data on software piracy is the best cross-
country measure currently used in the literature, subject to  some inherent upward bias3. From 
a broad view, the data on software piracy could be perceived as proxying for the extent of 
digital piracy.   
 
3.1.2  Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)  variables  
 
 IPRs variables are collected from the World Intellectual  Property Organization 
(WIPO). The four endogenous explaining variables gathered include: IPRs laws, Main IP 
laws,  WIPO Treaties, and Multilateral Treaties. IPRs laws and Main IP laws  are IP laws that 
are enacted by the legislature and enforced by institutions. WIPO administered treaties are 
defined from the day they enter into force for the contracting party (country). IP relevant 
Multilateral Treaties data is also gathered with respect to the date they are enforced by 
contracting parties.   
 
3.1.3 Instrumental and control variables  
 
In this section, we devote space to providing justification for the empirical validity of 
the instruments. This justification is essential for the relevance of the empirical analysis since 
a theoretical basis for the instrumental variables is crucial for sound and consistent 
                                                 
2
 Data from the BSA  primarily provide measurement for the piracy of commercial software.  More discussion 
on the reliability of piracy data could be obtained from Traphagan & Griffith (1998) and Png (2008). 
3This data has been widely used in the literature on piracy (Marron & Steel, 2000; Banerjee et al., 2005; Andrés, 
2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009).  
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interpretation of estimated coefficients. In other words, whereas the object of this article is to 
assess the effect of IPRs laws (treaties) on piracy, it also indirectly seeks to examine how 
government institutions are instrumental in the incidence of IPRs protection channels on 
piracy. The instrumental variable approach in the empirical section requires that the 
instruments be correlated with the main endogenous  explaining variable (piracy rate). Logic 
and common-sense have it that, government institutions and IPRs laws move hand in glove. 
Save in utopia, we cannot discuss one while ruling-out the other. Hence, only formal 
institutions set-up by the government in place can uphold and enforce IPRs laws (treaties). 
Measures indicating the quality of formal institutions include: the rule of law, regulation 
quality, government effectiveness,  corruption-control, political stability (no violence) and 
voice & accountability. We argue that, these good governance indicators are natural 
instruments for the upholding and enforcement of IPRs laws (treaties).   
Due to constraints in the degrees of freedom required for the test on validity of the 
instruments, we are unable to use more than one control variable at a time4. We employ two 
control variables: internet penetration and literacy rates.  From common sense and intuition, 
these rates should have a positive relationship with the level of piracy.  
Owing to constraints in piracy data availability, the data include annual observations 
for 11 African countries for the years 2000-2010. The data is made-up of six common law 
countries and five civil law countries. Details about the variable definitions (and data 
sources), summary statistics (with presentation of countries) and correlation analysis (showing 
the basic correlations between key variables used in this paper) are reported in the appendices.  
The summary statistics (Appendix 1) of the variables used in the panel regressions show that, 
there is quite a degree of variation in the data used so that one should be confident that 
                                                 
4
 An OIR test is employable only in the presence of over-identification. That is, the instruments should be higher 
than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In cases of exact-identification 
(instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identifications (instruments less than 
endogenous explaining variables), an OIR test is by definition not possible. 
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reasonable estimated relationships should emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix 
(Appendix 2) is to attenuate issues resulting from overparametization and multicolinearity.  
Based on the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any serious concerns  in terms 
of the relationships to be estimated.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
 This paper adopts a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation technique, in accordance with recent piracy literature (Andrés & Goel, 2012). 
2SLS estimation solves the puzzle of endogeneity and hence avoids the inconsistency of 
estimated coefficients by OLS when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error 
term in the main equation. More so, the IV approach is consistent with the questions in the 
introduction of this paper. The  2SLS estimation will entail the following steps: 
First-stage regression:  
 
++= itiit sInstrumentIP )(10 γγ itυ
                      (1)             
                               
                                                                  
Second-stage regression: 
 
++= itit IPPiracy )(10 γγ
 
itµ
                         (2)                                                                                        
 
In the first and second equations, itυ  and itµ  respectively denote the error terms. 
Instrumental variables are: regulation quality, control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, voice & accountability, rule of law and political stability. IP represents  IPRs 
laws (treaties): Main Intellectual Property Law, Intellectual Property Rights Law, WIPO 
Treaties and Multilateral Treaties. Piracy is the software piracy rate.  
We adopt the following steps in the 2SLS analysis: (1) justify the choice of an IV over 
an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the 
instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of the explaining variables (IPRs 
channels) and; (3) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in 
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the main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. Beside the control for 
endogeneity, further robustness of our models is ensured by the following: (1) use of both 
‘full data’ and ‘average data’ with non-overlapping intervals to capture the long-run and 
short-term tendencies of estimated coefficients respectively; (2) employment of robust 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors; (3) restricted and 
unrestricted modeling to control for the ‘legal origin and property rights’ theory.  
 
4. Empirical analysis  
 
4.1 Presentation of results  
 
This section examines the four main questions outlined in the introduction. (1) Which 
IPRs regimes matter in the fight against piracy? (2) How do legal origins matter in the 
effectiveness of IPRs regimes? (3) Are formal institutions instrumental in the enforcements of 
IPRs regimes?. (4) If so, for which IPRs protection channels are they instrumental? To 
examine these issues, we use the 2SLS approach with government quality instrumental 
variables.  
Table 1 below reports results for the IV regressions. ‘Full data’ reflects long-run 
estimate whereas two-year NOI estimates are short-term. We have employed restricted and 
unrestricted (with a constant) modeling approaches to control for the ‘law-property rights 
theory’.  For optimal specification of our models, two main tests are performed: the Hausman 
and the Sargan-OIR tests. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is the position that, OLS 
estimates are consistent and efficient. Hence, a rejection of the null hypothesis points to the 
issue of endogeneity and lends credit the choice of the IV estimation technique. The null 
hypothesis of the Sargan test is the stance that, the instruments do not explain piracy beyond 
IPRs laws (treaties) channels. In other words, the null hypothesis is the position that, the IPRs 
laws (treaties) are strictly exogenous and do not suffer from endogeneity when instrumented 
with government quality indicators. Hence, failure to reject the null hypothesis will indicate 
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the instruments are valid. Based on the findings in Table 1: the null hypotheses of the 
Hausman tests are overwhelmingly rejected for  all the models; but for Model 2 at a 10% 
significance level, the null hypotheses of the Sargan tests are not rejected. Therefore, results 
of both tests respectively justify the IV estimation approach and validate  the government 
quality instrumental variables.  We could not control for more than one variable at a time 
because of constraints in the Sargan-OIR test for instrument validity. We have six government 
quality instrumental variables and hence, must use less than six endogenous explaining 
variables to guarantee at least one degree of freedom: imperative for the OIR test. Both 
control variables are significant with the right signs.  
 
Table 1 : 2SLS Regressions (with HAC standard errors) 
 Dependent variable: Piracy rate 
 Common-law Civil-law   
 Full Data Two Year NOI Full Data Two Year NOI 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant  --- 0.440 --- 0.179 --- 2.555*** --- 3.061*** 
 
 (1.403)  (0.535)  (5.576)  (2.654) 
Main IP law -0.194*** -0.180*** -0.189*** -0.184*** -0.41*** -0.37*** -0.471** -0.451** 
 
(-10.24) (-8.117) (-8.326) (-8.301) (-5.649) (-4.429) (-2.080) (-2.182) 
IPRs law 0.142*** 0.074 0.127** 0.103*** 0.203*** 0.175*** 0.256 0.241 
 
(3.607) (1.324) (2.542) (2.654) (4.110) (2.726) (1.587) (1.564) 
WIPO Treaties  -0.155*** -0.137*** -0.117* -0.116** -0.063 -0.15*** -0.103 -0.219** 
 
(-2.672) (-3.508) (-1.931) (-2.310) (-0.911) (-4.860) (-1.170) (-2.215) 
Multilat. Treaties -0.077*** -0.095*** -0.069*** -0.076*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.142* -0.154* 
 
(-4.421) (-8.052) (-3.088) (-3.835) (-4.323) (-3.127) (-1.723) (-1.807) 
Internet Penetration  0.690*** 0.572*** 0.629*** 0.588*** --- --- --- --- 
 (7.555) (4.210) (6.074) (4.533)     
Literacy rate  --- --- --- --- 1.285*** --- 1.453** --- 
 
    (6.773)  (2.457)  
 
        
Hausman test  151.77*** 134.71*** 132.14*** 95.140*** 114.76*** 148.27*** 62.223*** 123.02*** 
 
        
Sargan  OIR test  3.231 2.753* 1.617 1.768 2.520 0.840 2.482 1.094 
 
[0.198 ] [0.097] [0.445 ] [0.183] [0.283 ] [0.656 ] [0.289 ] [0.578] 
Adjusted R² 0.863 0.885 0.864 0.875 0.439 0.484 0.120 0.170 
Fisher  4122.4*** 314.86*** 3408.6*** 18.627*** 52.977*** 130.60*** 1.55e+15*** 297.55*** 
Countries  6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 
Observations  46 46 26 26 44 44 44 44 
         
Instruments  Constant; Control of Corruption; Government Effectiveness; Rule of Law; Regulation Quality; Political 
Stability; Voice & Accountability 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]:P-values. Initial piracy: estimated lagged 
endogenous variable (piracy rate). Dif: Difference. Sys: System. GMM: Generalized Methods of Moments.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent. SE: Standard Errors. NOI: Non overlapping intervals. Main IP: Main Intellectual Property.  IPRs: Intellectual 
Property Rights.  WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization. Multilat: Multilateral. OIR: Overidentifying restrictions.  
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4.2 Discussion of results and policy implications 
 
4.2.1 Law and property rights theory 
 
 From the results in Table 1, we notice a very significant constant term for civil law 
countries. This confirms the ‘law and property right theory’ we discussed in Section 2.1. 
Autonomous piracy in civil law countries is significant because, inherently, contrary to their 
common law counterparts, civil law countries were handed down a legal heritage that 
continue to shape private property rights protection in a negative way. While common law 
champions private property rights vis-à-vis the powers to the state, civil law inherently does 
the contrary. Hence, the significant autonomous piracy. Our position in this interpretation is 
supported by a substantial bulk of literature (Coase, 1960; Stigler, 1964; Posner, 1973; Rubin, 
1977; Priest, 1977; Rubin,1982; Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991; Bailey & Rubin, 1994; La 
Porta et al., 1998;  Porta et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2003; Rajan & Zingales, 2003; Beck & 
Levine, 2005) 
 
4.2.2 Which  IPRs regimes matter in the fight against piracy? 
 
 But for IPRs laws, the other IP laws (WIPO treaties, Main IP law and Multilateral 
treaties) reduce the incidence of piracy. This finding is consistent across legal origins and 
time-static (stable across short-run and long-term estimates). The fact that IPRs laws channel 
reflects a positive incidence on piracy in both common and civil law countries, means other 
issues common to both types of legal systems significantly affect the enforcement of the IPRs 
laws enacted by the legislature. Investigating this concern could be an interesting future 
research direction.  
 
4.2.3 How do legal origins matter in the effectiveness of IPRs laws (regimes)? 
 
 In both short-run and long-term, IPRs protection channels in civil law countries appear 
to mitigate piracy more than in common law countries. There are two possible explanations to 
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this. (1) IPRs protection channels in civil law countries have a higher impact on the piracy 
rate because of the inherent absence of a ‘property rights’ legal culture; as confirmed by the 
significant constant. This explanation is logical in the perspective that, where the prevalence 
of piracy is already high (constant significant term), the effects of introducing IPRs laws will 
be greater on the rate of piracy than in regions with traditionally low prevalence piracy rates. 
The inherent higher prevalence of piracy  in civil law countries could further be observed 
from the summary statistics (Appendix 1) with the mean piracy rate in civil law countries 
0.462 as opposed to 0.368 in their common law counterparts. (2) The higher incidence of 
IPRs laws (treaties) in civil countries could originate from the government quality 
instruments. Where more government resources are devoted to the fight against piracy 
through IPRs protection channels, it is only natural that the effect could be greater.  
 
4.2.4 Are formal institutions instrumental in the enforcement of IPRs laws (treaties)? If so, for 
which IPRs laws (channels)? 
 The answer is a simple yes. The null hypotheses of the Sargan OIR tests are 
overwhelmingly rejected. Implying formal institutions are instrumental in the fight against 
piracy through IPRs laws (treaties) channels. But for one channel, government quality 
dynamics are instrumental in all the IPRs mechanisms investigated.  
  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
 The recent trend of globalization, strengthened by increasingly sophisticated 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) has motivated efforts towards increasing 
and harmonizing the standards (and enforcement) of IPRs protection worldwide. Europe and 
North America have mastered the dynamics IP and inexorably driving developments in the 
global and international arena. Other regions like Asia and South America are reacting in 
calculated steps that underscores the role of IP in the current pursuit of national, regional and 
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international initiatives. In Africa, IPRs issues are also assuming central stage in discussions 
on development in the continent. To ease current efforts towards harmonizing IPRs regimes in 
the continent, this paper has provided answers to four key questions for which policy makers 
could be seeking answers.  
 The following findings have been established. (1) In comparison to common law 
countries, civil law countries inherently have a significant autonomous rate of piracy; 
consistent with the ‘law and property rights’ theory. (2) But for IPRs laws, the other IP 
protection channels (WIPO treaties, Main IP law and Multilateral treaties) reduce the 
incidence of piracy. (3) In both short-run and long-term, IPRs protection channels in civil law 
countries appear to mitigate piracy more than in common law countries. (4) Formal 
institutions are instrumental in the fight against piracy through IPRs protection channels.  
.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean  S.D  Min Max Obser. 
       
 
Dependent  Variable 
Piracy rate 2.745 1.857 0.000 5.250 121 
Piracy rate (Common law) 0.368 0.349 -0.288 0.720 60 
Piracy rate (Civil law) 0.462 0.234 0.034 0.720 46 
       
 
 
Independent  Variables  
Main IP law 2.256 2.835 0.000 11.000 121 
IPRs law 1.438 1.944 0.000 7.000 121 
WIPO Treaties  2.735 0.793 2.000 4.000 121 
Multilateral Treaties 9.628 3.304 4.000 17.00 121 
       
Control Variables  Internet Penetration  2.888 0.799 1.301 4.727 121 
Literacy  1.826 0.097 1.572 1.956 110 
       
 
 
Instrumental Variables  
Control of Corruption -0.309 0.641 -1.236 1.086 110 
Rule of Law -0.302 0.687 -1.657 1.053 110 
Regulation Quality -0.180 0.547 -1.305 0.905 110 
Government Effectiveness -0.164 0.583 -1.038 0.807 100 
Voice & Accountability -0.277 0.69 -1.256 1.047 110 
Political Stability (No violence) -0.393 0.842 -2.094 0.996 110 
       
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
 
Algeria (F), Botswana (E), Cameroon (F), Egypt (F),  Kenya (E), Mauritius (E), Morocco (F), Nigeria (E), 
Senegal (F), South Africa (E), Zambia(E).  
 
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation matrix  
              
  Piracy 
rate 
IP Independent variables Government Quality Instrumental variables Control variables   
MIPL IPRL WIPO Multi CC RL RQ GE VA PolS Internet Literacy 
 
1.00 -0.71 -0.01 0.32 0.02 -0.43 -0.50 -0.60 -0.60 -0.42 -0.29 -0.18 
-0.34 Piracy 
 1.00 0.10 -0.27 -0.22 0.23 0.10 0.29 0.43 0.29 0.01 0.43 0.35 MIPL 
  1.00 0.30 0.44 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.28 -0.02 0.01 0.25 
-0.39 IPRL 
   1.00 0.31 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.22 0.20 
-0.53 WIPO 
    1.00 -0.26 -0.06 -0.15 -0.12 -0.20 -0.14 0.35 
-0.61 Multi 
     1.00 0.90 0.86 0.94 0.79 0.77 -0.30 0.41 CC 
      1.00 0.87 0.88 0.72 0.82 -0.26 0.37 RL 
       1.00 0.93 0.84 0.76 -0.25 0.46 RQ 
        1.00 0.83 0.71 -0.12 0.40 GE 
         1.00 0.72 -0.35 0.40 VA 
          1.00 -0.49 0.41 PolS 
           1.00 
-0.10 Internet 
            1.00 Literacy 
              
MIPL: Main Intellectual Property Rights. IPRL: Intellectual Property Rights Law. WIPO: WIPO Treaties. Multi: Multilateral Treaties. CC: 
Control of Corruption. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. VA: Voice & Accountability. PolS: 
Political Stability.  
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Piracy  Piracy  Logarithm Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Main IP law  MIPL Main Intellectual Property Law WIPO 
    
IPRs law IPRL Intellectual Property Rights Law WIPO 
    
WIPO Treaties  WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization  Treaties  WIPO 
    
Multilateral Treaties  Multi Multilateral  IP Treaties  WIPO 
    
Internet Penetration  Internet  Logarithm of Internet Users  WDI (World Bank) 
    
Literacy  Literacy  Logarithm of literacy  WDI (World Bank) 
    
Control of Corruption CC Control of Corruption(estimate):Captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
WDI (World Bank) 
    
Rule of Law RL Rule of Law(estimate): Captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
WDI (World Bank) 
    
Regulation Quality  RQ Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development.  
WDI (World Bank) 
    
Government Effectiveness  GE Government Effectiveness(estimate): Measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments 
commitments to such policies 
WDI (World Bank) 
    
Voice & Accountability  VA Voice and Accountability (estimate): Measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media.  
WDI (World Bank) 
    
Political Stability PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate): Measured as  
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism.  
WDI (World Bank) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  BSA: Business Software Alliance. Log: Logarithm. WIPO: World Intellectual Property 
Organization. IP: Intellectual Property.  
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